set-up costs will in general lead to more firms than are socially optimal in the industry.
I. A MODEL OF STRATEGIC INVESTMENT
We present the general model in this section, and will consider more specific cases in section III. All functions are assumed to be differentiable when required.
Firms have a standard two-input constant-returns production function:
Each firm's production function f : R -+ R+ is homogeneous to degree one and strictly concave in each input:
Xi =fi(ki,Li) fk,L > 0 >ILL,fkk where ki and Li are capital and labour inputs of the ith firm. This assumption is stronger than required, but it simplifies the analysis. We can then define the firm's cost function in the standard manner taking the factor prices w and r as parameters. Under AI this can be written as k * s(p). Thus s(p) is the profit-maximising output-per-unit-capital. Obviously, the strict convexity and differentiability of c(x/k) imply that s is strictly increasing in p, and its second derivative s" will be positive or negative depending on c"'. In effect, through its choice of ki, the ith firm chooses the supply function it will have in the market-stage.
We consider a two stage model. In the first "strategic" stage, firins precommit their capital stock. In the second "market stage", firms' capital stocks are fixed, and a competitive equilibrium occurs. In order to define the competitive price we need to state our assumptions about the industry demand function. where primes denote derivatives with respect to price, which are evaluated at 0(k). The numerator si will vary between firms, whilst the denominator is common to all firms, and reflects the fact that as the price falls, firms' outputs will fall. If firms are identical then (I.I) and (I.3) simplify, since 0 will depend only on the total capital stock Ykj, as will a0/aki. We are now in a position to define the firm's payoff function Ui, giving the profit earned as a function of the capital stocks chosen in the strategic move. Note that the LHS of (2.3) is the ith firm's profit to sales ratio. Hence in equilibrium, each firm's profit to sales ratio will be equal to the elasticity of the market price with respect to its own capital. Clearly, the profit to sales ratio must equal the price-average-cost-margin, and when we expand the LHS of It is easily shown that the equilibrium price 0* in the market stage will be greater than the long-run (least) average cost ai for all firms that produce in equilibrium. If 0* < ai, then the ith firm will make a loss if it produces anything at all, and if 0* = ai it will earn nothing. Since we restrict ourselves to k* >> o, the price must be greater than or equal to ai. But if 0* = ai, then the firm could reduce ki slightly, thus increasing 0 and hence earn positive profits.
In Thus the profit to sales ratio equals the reciprocal of the sum of demand and supply elasticities (evaluated at 0*), divided by the number of firms. In an industry with es =-8d = I, and fifteen firms, the profit to sales ratio would be I /30 th. Equation (2.7) is clearly similar to the equilibrium condition in the CournotNash model. As we argue in Dixon [I984a] , perhaps the most natural and convincing interpretation of the standard Cournot model is that firms precommit both factors of production, so that in the strategic move firms choose a capacity, and in the market stage a competitive equilibrium (occurs that is, the price clears the market). Hence the symmetric Cournot equilibrium is given by:
Comparing (2.8) with the equilibrium condition for the strategic investment case, we can see that they differ in two important respects. First, on the LHS of (2.8) the price cost margin is given as a mark-up on a. Second, the RHS of (2.8) and (2.7) are directly comparable, and might lead us to expect that the profit to sales ratio in the strategic investment case will be less than in the Cournot case. However, even if this is so, we cannot infer that the equilibrium price will therefore be lower in the strategic investment case. For any given price 0, the Cournot profit to sales ratio is larger, since average costs are at their minimum. It is therefore quite possible that 0* > Oc even though the inequality is reversed for the respective profit to sales ratios. No general comparison is presented in this paper.' However, in the linear model in section III, the Cournot price will always be the higher of the two. It can also be shown in the case of Cobb-Douglas firms and constant elasticity demand, that a sufficient condition for O > 6* is inelastic demand (Ed >-i). The presence of ?S in (2.7) reflects the fact that in choosing its capital stock, the firm takes into account not only the downward slope of the demand curve, but also the reduction in (all) firms' outputs as 0 falls. In the Cournot case, of course, these outputs are treated as constant.
An implication of the fact that 0* > ai is that firms will employ an inefficient technology, and incur costs in excess of ai. The reason for this is that the firm is on its short-run cost curve in the market stage. Hence it will only employ least-cost technology if 0* = ai. If 0* > ai, then the firm will not be on its long-run cost-curve, and will in fact be undercapitalised: the firm's output capital ratio s(0*) is higher than the cost-minimising ratio s(a), so that the firm employs an excessively labour intensive technology. Although the firm is maximising profits, the strategic structure of the model-and the resultant asymmetry between the firm's choice of capital and labour-implies that the firm does not employ the least-cost technology.
In order to bring out even more clearly the nature of the distortion, we can telescope the firm's decision into a simple optimisation programme: From (2.9) and (2. IO) we can see that the dependence of the competitive price in the firm's capital stock reduces the "marginal revenue product" fromfk to fks(0), and hence leads to a lower capital-labour ratio than required for least-cost production. When choosing ki, the firm takes into account both its effect on the subgame price, and its effect on costs via the capital-labour ratio. At k*, if any firm were to increase its capital stock, the gains from a lower output-capital ratio in terms of reducing average costs would be outweighed by the resultant fall in 0. It should be clear from this simple treatment that the undercapitalisation result is general in this model, and does not depend at all on the assumption of constant returns in Ai.
The symmetric industry equilibrium is depicted in Figure I . The equilibrium price 0* is determined by the intersection of the industry demand function and the supply function which results from the capital stocks chosen in the strategic stage. The U-shaped industry "short-run" average cost curve is marked AC. The strategic inefficiency due to under capitalisation is represented by the fact that average cost AC* is less than marginal cost in equilibrium. The industry profits Sk* 7r(0*) are given by the area A. The profit to sales ratio is given by In the strategic investment model presented here the inefficiency is due to the dynamic structure of the model, not the fact that the best monopoly profit is a quiet life. In the market stage, the managers minimise costs: the inefficiency stems from the constraint the managers have imposed on themselves by their choice of capital in the strategic stage. In section III below, we show that in a linearised model (Case 2), the welfare loss due to strategic inefficiency may well be larger than the conventional triangle. This is not surprising, since the efficiency loss is AC* -a multiplied by the entire industry output.
We have now explored the properties of the strategic investment equilibrium. Even if the product market is perfectly competitive-or at least approximately so-the possibility of strategic commitment of capital would lead to prices above least-average cost.
The second important property of the model leads firms to choose undercapitalised technologies that are economically inefficient. It should be noted that this result only occurs because the firm is forced to separate its choice of capital and labour, and cannot choose them simultaneously. As we discuss in Dixon [1984a], were firms able to precommit both factors of production, and hence their capacity, then there would be no strategic factor bias, and the equilibrium of the two stage game would be Cournot. The strategic inefficiency is also related to the nature of the technology. Even in the case where firms precommit only capital, if the technology is Leontief or putty-clay, then in effect output and labour are thereby precommited, so that there will be a Cournot outcome with no strategic inefficiency. We should also note that the undercapitalisation result stems from the particular nature of the market subgame: had we assumed a Cournot equilibrium in the market stage, we would have obtained an overcapitalisation result, as in Brander and Spencer [I983] .2
III. SOME EXPLICIT SOLUTIONS TO THE MODEL
In order to explore the mechanisms of the model more closely, it is useful to consider some specific functional forms. We will consider two cases. In case I we will explore the model in the case of identical firms with Cobb-Douglas technology, and constant elasticity demand. In case 2 we explore the model when firms may be different, but demand and supply functions are "linear". The second case is particularly simple for exploring the welfare loss due to strategic inefficiency. Consideration of these examples also gives us some ideas about existence in the model, since in both cases an equilibrium will exist under fairly weak conditions. We also specialise A2 to constant elasticity of demand:
A2(a):
Under Ai (a) and A2(a), the profit to sales ratio will be uniquely determined by the three parameters of the model: n, a and ,B. Before proceeding to the explicit solution, however, it is necessary to consider whether or not an equilibrium exists: equation ( Under what conditions will k* so defined be an equilibrium? Proposition I gives a sufficient condition for the payoff function to be quasi-concave.
Proposition i (AI (a), A2 (a)) A unique symmetric equilibrium exists if I I-Ed+2 es I-

* (Es Ed)
The proof is given in the appendix. A sufficient condition for Proposition I to be satisfied is that demand is elastic. If there are more than a few firms, 4 will be close to unity, so that we can be reasonably assured of existence. Under Ai (a) the profit to sales ratio is given by: More can be said about the relationship with the Cournot case. If firms have constant returns Leontief technology, for example, then the output (or rather capacity) will be tied down in the strategic stage, and hence the Cournot equilibrium will occur. A further interesting property of the Leontief case is that there is no strategic inefficiency since, given its capacity, the firm will not employ labour over and above the minimum technically required, whatever the market price. Indeed, there will be no inefficiency for any technology for which the capacity is determined by the choice of capital stock. For example, if technology is putty-clay, then the capital labour ratio will be efficient, and the strategic investment equilibrium will be the Cournot equilibrium. One of the properties of the strategic investment equilibrium is that production is inefficient. The rest of this section of the paper is devoted to deriving explicit terms for this inefficiency in the linear case.
The excessive labour-capital ratio leads to average-costs in excess of minimum average costs a. Hence the strategic-inefficiency in production can be measured by:
(-) (3-9)
AC-a = (0 -) 20 We are now in a position to derive an expression giving the total welfare loss in the strategic investment game as a function of 0*. There are, we recall, two sources of "lost" consumer's surplus in the strategic investment model, as depicted in Figure i . First, we have the standard. welfare-loss given by the "triangle" under the demand curve, area A. It is quite clear that the total welfare loss is strictly monotonic for 0 > a. However, whilst the standard welfare-loss triangle increases with 0, the strategic inefficiency Aw2 is not monotonic. From (3.I I) we can see that the strategic inefficiency is equal to zero both when output is zero (0 = f ), and when AC = a (0 = a). We could reasonably expect that the welfare loss due to strategic inefficiency might be rather large relative to the standard welfare loss. If we compare (3.10-3), then:
Thus the consumer surplus lost through strategic inefficiency equals the surplus lost via the triangle divided by the elasticity of demand. For Ed > -i, the strategic inefficiency will represent the more important welfare loss. This is not so surprising, since the welfare loss due to strategic inefficiency is the excess cost multiplied by the entire industry output, so that even if the average cost is only slightly in excess of the minimum, it will be considerably magnified. The importance of strategic inefficiency in this model is not peculiar to this specification.
IV. STRATEGIC INVESTMENT AND ENTRY
The main body of this paper has assumed that there is a fixed set of active incumbents in the industry, with no entry or exit. This section provides a simple example of how entry might be modelled, and its welfare implications. It needs to be made quite clear from the outset that this section is more an outline than a detailed formal analysis. The special case considered provides an interesting illustration that is reasonably typical. There are many ways of treating entry, depending on when entry is allowed.3 We shall consider the simplest case: we add an extra entry move prior to the strategic stage of the model. Firms incur sunk set-up costs u > o. There is an infinite set of identical firms, which make their entry decision in some preordained order. Given the number of firms that decide to enter, a strategic investment equilibrium occurs. No entry occurs after the initial entry move. In evaluating the profits from entry, firms have perfect foresight.
With strictly positive set-up costs and constant returns to scale production, the model is of course the rather special case of natural monopoly (since the industry cost structure is super-additive (see Baumol et al. [I982] ). Whilst this makes the analysis very simple, the qualitative results are generally valid.
Consider first the social optimum in this industry, which we shall take to be the Ramsey solution, which maximises the consumer surplus subject to the self-financing constraint. The Ramsey solution is the triplet {n,,ar,kl}, the optimal number of firms, price, and capital stock respectively. Since the industry is a natural monopoly, the analysis is very simple, since we know that nr= I. Furthermore, it will be socially optimal to produce efficiently, with the output capital ratio v. Since demand is downward sloping, the Ramsey optimal price and capital stock are those which maximise output subject to the finance constraint: To see why, note that if Q( i) > u, there will be more than one firm. Entry in excess of the social optimum will occur unless entry costs are large, where "large" means that a > Q(2).
(ii) Inefficiency in Production: We know from the analysis in section II that the method of producing output will be inefficient, being under-capitalised. This is unchanged by entry, since 0* > a for all finite n. Chamberlinian Excess Capacity (i)-(iii) will still be directly valid. The only important modification concerns comparison (iv). If we ignore the integer problem, in the Ramsey solution each firm will produce at the bottom of its "long run" average cost curve. This implies a certain capital stock for each firm, denoted ka. However, in the strategic investment equilibrium the zero profit entry condition will mean that firms will produce at below the least cost capacity, as depicted in Figure 2 , which depicts a symmetric equilibrium as in Figure i , except that the LRAC is U-shaped. Thus we can extend (iv) to include the standard "Chamberlinian" undercapacity result. Not only are firms off their LRAC as in the constant returns case, but the output is below the minimum economic scale (k* < ka).
With the introduction of a U-shaped cost function, we have a rather paradoxical result. Given the capital stocks chosen in equilibrium, there is overutilisation of capacity, an excessive output-capital ratio. This is due to strategic inefficiency. The entry condition, however, implies that the capital stock is too small, being less than the "capacity" level ka.
V. CONCLUSION
There may still be a relationship between concentration and welfare loss even in an industry where conditions in the product market are competitive. Firms can employ such variables as investment to influence the market outcome, and their ability to do so is directly related to their "market share", interpreted as the firm's share in the industry capital stock. This leads to a price which is higher than the price that occurs when investment is not employed strategically, and there is a corresponding welfare loss due to the resultant restriction of output. The strategic use of investment in this way also gives rise to an additional inefficiency in production, since the technology will be too labour intensive. In the simple linear model presented in section III, the welfare loss due to this strategic inefficiency may be larger than the loss due to the price being too high. This suggests that the evaluation of monopoly power needs to go beyond a simple analysis of the conditions in the product market and the actual cost structure of firms, and to take into account such strategic behaviour and the distortions to which it gives rise.
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